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The North European Way of Ransoming: 
Explorations into an Unknown Dimension 
of the Early Modern Welfare State 
Magnus Ressel  
Abstract: »Die nordeuropäische Art des Gefangenenfreikaufs: Eine unbekann-
te Dimension des frühmodernen Wohlfahrtsstaates«. This article is concerned 
with distinctly “confessional” characteristics in the organization of buying 
back captured sailors out of Northern Africa. The history and ways of slave 
redemption of Hamburg, Lubeck, the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway and the 
Netherlands are presented, analyzed and compared. As a result it is possible to 
distinguish the comparatively prominent role that centralized, bureaucratized 
and governmentally administered institutions played in the ransoming business 
of the Lutheran world. 
Keywords: white slavery, captivity, Barbary corsairs, welfare state, confes-
sional mentality, imagined empathy. 
Introduction 
When in 1994, with the United Nations Development Report, the concept of 
“human security” was introduced into political discourse, the concept was 
exemplified in somewhat solemn words:  
In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that 
did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in 
violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern 
with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity.1 
The most important change that the concept of “human security” is expected 
to bring is the departure from a narrow perspective of security. It is meant as a 
global and people-centered security concept that is expressly set in contrast to 
the traditional focus on state security.2 Even though the concept is clearly 
meant to be used for problems of our time, the universal aim of prevention of 
human suffering as the ultimate goal is certainly not a novelty in itself. This is 
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acknowledged by important authors on “human security”, who see this concept 
as being rooted in history with its origins going back to Greek antiquity.3 
For a historian it is tempting to elaborate on this point and to look more 
deeply at the historical dimension of “human security”, i.e. the origins and the 
development of the emphasis on the individual’s rights. One contribution was 
made in 2007, when the historian Lynn Hunt argued that the reason why human 
rights gained such importance in the 18th century was a growing “imagined 
empathy” of large parts of the society for suffering individuals, a development 
that she sees at this time as peculiar to the Western world.4 The equality of 
human beings was stressed more and more and as a consequence, the state and 
other institutions were increasingly regarded as providers and protectors of 
these rights. The idea of “imagined empathy” has not yet gained widespread 
currency and its connection with an increasing insistence on basic human rights 
is rarely found in the existing literature. At this point, the concept of “imagined 
empathy” therefore remains vague and unspecific. 
It is here that this article aims to contribute. I will try to exemplify the phe-
nomenon of “imagined empathy” with a certain subject within to a certain 
subject in history and try to connect it to a directly related “production of hu-
man security”. In order to do so, a definition is needed beforehand: Wherever 
we see in history a phenomenon where suffering of individuals leads towards 
recognizable actions of large group-systems with the goal of reducing or re-
moving the origins of this suffering, we may speak of a form of “production of 
human security” avant la lettre. With this definition at hand, “imagined empa-
thy” becomes specifiable in the concrete modes of security production for 
individuals organized by larger groups. In the following article I will try to give 
an example of this by examining a very specific form of “production of human 
security” and connecting it with the mentality of distinguishable group-
systems. 
I. The Problems of the Barbary Corsairs 
for Northern Europe 
For over 300 years (roughly ~1520-1830), the so-called “Barbary pirates”, 
Muslim corsairs operating from the present-day Maghreb states, cruised in the 
waters of Southern Europe and posed a serious danger towards Christian 
Europe. The ships of all European nations came under threat as soon as they 
operated in a zone comprising the entire Mediterranean and the Atlantic, within 
a sector that reached from Cape Finisterre in the north to the Canary Islands in 
the south-west. Because the southbound ships of Northern Europe were usually 
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the largest of their time, carrying a cargo of great value and making exchanges 
between two distinct geographical zones, the profitability of this branch of 
shipping was exceptionally high. Therefore, many merchants of all nations 
were attracted and consequently had to deal with the problem of the Muslim 
corsairs. 
One of the most pressing aspects of this conflict for contemporaries was the 
high number of Europeans who found themselves imprisoned in Northern 
Africa. A flood of letters pleading for rescue emanated from Northern African 
cities and found its way to concerned relatives in all parts of Europe. These 
letters and actively petitioning relatives were a heavy burden on the conscience 
of the merchants and the governmental authorities, both of whom benefited 
most from the trade with Southern Europe. 
During the Early Modern epoch, all important continental Northern nations 
were at some time heavily involved in long-distance trade with Southern 
Europe. The two most prominent Early Modern German harbor cities, Ham-
burg and Lubeck, began to conduct this trade in large quantities in the last third 
of the 16th century. The northern Netherlands were able to inherit the rich trade 
connections of Flanders and Brabant after the beginning of the Dutch revolt 
and after 1590 began to appear in great numbers in the Mediterranean. Den-
mark, in contrast, did not organize a trade beyond Cape Finisterre on a consid-
erable scale before the beginning of the 18th century, but was then quickly able 
to catch up with its competitors.5 The two Hanseatic cities, the Netherlands and 
Denmark consequently all had to deal with the problem of incarceration of their 
sailors in Northern Africa. 
In the following, I will elaborate on the reactions this problem triggered in 
Northern Europe and try to connect the findings with confessional characteris-
tics. Put more abstractly: The relation between a confessional mentality and its 
embedding in institutions charged with a specific production of human security 
are the main subject of this article. I will argue that the answer to the question 
“Why did states dominated by the Lutheran or Calvinist creed react towards 
this problem in the specific way they did?” can give us profound insights into 
the “imagined empathy” of the respective confessions. In order to make this 
claim, I will follow a step-by-step approach. First, I will briefly present an 
overview of the history of Catholic ransoming. Then, I will describe the dis-
course and practice of ransoming in the Hanseatic cities, Denmark and the 
Netherlands but with the important reservation that I will only look at the most 
important level of this business, the governmental layer.6 Finally, I will inter-
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pret the findings with the help of current research in the sociology of welfare 
states and try to put the entire business of ransom into a broader perspective. 
II. The Origins and Practice of Ransoming 
in the Mediterranean 
With the intensification of the “petite guerre”7 between Muslims and Christians 
during the 16th century, the numbers of captives in Northern Africa swelled to 
disproportionate sizes.8 Even if the number of 1.25 million Christian slaves in 
the Barbary states which a historian has put forward9 may be “fantasmatique”10, 
the great dimensions of this problem for the Mediterranean world cannot be 
doubted. With the foundation of the “Santa Casa della Redenzione dei Cattivi” 
in Naples in 1548, the state stepped in for the first time on the Italian peninsula 
to organize the ransoming independently from the religious orders. Soon, the 
other important Italian territorial states followed suit and founded governmen-
tally controlled bodies to organize the ransoming of their own nationals. Venice 
gave its “Provveditori sopra Ospedali e Luoghi Pii” the control of ransoming in 
158611 and Genoa opened its “Magistrato per il riscatto degli Schiavi” in 
159712; other Italian states did the same in the second half of the 16th century.13 
In Spain, in contrast, the Trinitarians were able to dominate the ransoming 
throughout the Early Modern Era.14 One of the most eminent historians on the 
Barbary corsairs, Salvatore Bono, thus distinguishes between two Catholic 
ways of ransoming: The monastic orders operated in the larger Catholic mon-
archies and the Case di redenzione worked “quasi esclusivamente” in Italy.15  
What were the main features of these two models? In both cases, the in-
comes derived not from obligatory duties, but from donations or bequests col-
lected by clerics of the Catholic Church. Operating on a grand scale with close 
proximity to the field of action, these institutions seem to have been rather 
professional at conducting their business. Yet, whereas a Casa di redenzione 
operated directly on behalf of the home state, the orders retained more inde-
pendence in their ransoming activities. At the moment, it seems that the orders 
were the more effective ransomers within the Mediterranean. Even if the num-
ber of over 100,000 redeemed captives, which a historian has put forward for 
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the Trinitarians,16 might be exaggerated, their efficacy of ransoming cannot be 
doubted. However, this large number cannot conceal the great problems that 
the Catholic world had in ransoming their brethren. From a detailed study of 
four ransoming missions from 1660-1666, we learn that the average duration of 
captivity of a Catholic in Northern Africa was, due to lack of funds, four to five 
years.17  
III. The Governmental Institutions of Ransom 
in the Cities of Hamburg and Lubeck 
The weakness or often total absence of orders in the Protestant world after the 
Reformation forestalled the activity of redemptionist orders in Northern 
Europe. Alms-collecting by relatives of the captives to finance the ransom was 
the obvious recourse of which we have the first notice in the year 1547 in the 
city of Danzig.18 For the following 70 years, this was the usual recourse in the 
entire northern German world. It sufficed as long as the numbers of captives 
remained small. After the beginning of the Dutch uprising against their Spanish 
overlords in 1568, however, the southbound trade of Lubeck and Hamburg 
soared. Thus, in the last third of the 16th century, for the first time large num-
bers of Germans found themselves caught in Northern Africa. The problem got 
out of hand in the last decade of the 16th century when alms-collecting no 
longer proved adequate to buy the large numbers of captives back. The average 
duration of captivity grew longer, the number of letters begging for rescue 
increased. In the first decade of the 17th century, we see brotherhoods of sail-
ors intervening in the Hanseatic cities and paying for ransom, because the alms 
collections no longer sufficed. 
With the renewal of fighting between the Dutch and the Spanish after 1621, 
the Hanseatic trade to Iberia and the Mediterranean experienced another great 
rise, which coincided with the greatest Muslim corsair activity ever seen.19 The 
ensuing clash led to the largest number of Germans ever caught by Muslim 
corsairs. Only one year after the fighting had recommenced, the captains and 
officers of the Hamburg ships founded the “Stück-von-Achten-Kasse”, a fra-
ternity pledged to the redemption of its members. Membership was on a volun-
tary basis but was restricted to captains and ship officers.20 Thus, the lower 
deck found itself abandoned and left to the risk of having to remain in Muslim 
bondage without the least bit of hope of being rescued. Since the ordinary 
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sailors mostly came from the poorer parts of society, the necessary ransom 
sums were in all likelihood never payable by their relatives. 
At this point the state stepped in and took on responsibility for its subjects. 
An institution was founded, which can be called, with some justification, the 
first obligatory social insurance in the world. In May 1624, after some months 
of debate within the governing apparatus and with the society of the shipmen, 
the Hamburger Sklavenkasse was created.21 It was an office administered by 
the Hamburg Admiralty, which had the duty to collect from every sailor and 
respective shipowner a fixed amount of money if the ship had a destination 
west of the Netherlands. This money was to be used to buy back captives from 
Northern Africa. The basic principle of the Sklavenkasse was to eliminate the 
risk of captivity by transforming it to a fiscal fee shared by all risk-bearers. The 
message of the government to its sailors was clear: you will be safe in southern 
waters, you are protected by your state regardless of the perils which wait for 
you there, even if the worst happens and you get caught by the Muslim enemy. 
Soon after the foundation of the Hamburg Sklavenkasse, Lubeck followed 
with its own Sklavenkasse in 1627.22 Immediately after their foundation both 
institutions came under heavy financial pressure from the exacting demands of 
the situation in the southern waters. This often led to a lack of funds and re-
sulted several times during their first years in the inability to pay for the re-
demption.23 Nevertheless, the Sklavenkassen continued their business even 
when an ever-increasing number of captives had to be ransomed. Because the 
profits in this trade at this specific time of war were very large, a merchant 
class prone to engage in profitable risks would not let itself be stopped even by 
intense corsair activity, and continued to send large numbers of ships south-
west. 
The port cities of Hamburg and Lubeck were two of very few places in 
Europe which could maintain their neutrality throughout the entire Thirty 
Years’ War. Their shipping was thus able to penetrate deep down southward 
during this conflict and provide the cities with large revenues. One can regard it 
as a sign of steadfast Hanseatic loyalty that the two founding cities of the old 
league allowed their twin institutions to share the burden of ransoming by 
giving money to the respective Sklavenkasse in case of need. Yet, even this 
sharing of burdens did not suffice to finance the tolls which the intense war 
with the corsairs put on the Sklavenkassen. Their income basis needed to be 
enlarged quite early after their foundation. The Lubeck Sklavenkasse had to be 
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reformed only two years after its start, in 1629.24 Hamburg followed suit in 
1641.25 
Before these reforms, apart from the money which the Sklavenkassen ob-
tained from collections in the churches, the individual crew members had to 
pay the lion’s share for these institutions. After 1629 in Lubeck and 1641 in 
Hamburg, the shipowners were obliged to contribute substantial sums accord-
ing to the load a ship carried and its destination. The closer the destination was 
to the Barbary corsairs, the higher the rate that was to be paid. Thus, we have 
three different sources of income for the German Sklavenkassen. The first one 
was provided by the crew members: they had to pay a high percentage of their 
income if the ship’s destination lay west or south-west of Brest and only half of 
this rate for the “safer” destinations east of Brest.26 The next source came from 
the shipowners according to shipload and a division of the map into risk zones; 
and a third one were the always ongoing alms collections. 
Until 1750 both institutions remained under great strain to pursue the ran-
soming. In the 14 “hot” years from 1615-1629, the smaller of the two cities, 
Lubeck, lost at least 22 large ships to the corsairs.27 In the relatively “calm” 28 
years between 1719 and 1747 we know of 50 Hamburgian ships which got 
caught by the corsairs; this meant captivity in Northern Africa for 633 sailors.28 
It should be noted that this number of captives is more than thrice that of Den-
mark during the same time, which gives a good hint at the respective size of 
Hamburg’s and Denmark’s southbound trade in these years. Apart from the 
1,809,200 Mark Lübisch, which Hamburg had to pay for ransom, the loss of 
the precious ships was disastrous for a single city, even of the size of Hamburg. 
After 1750, it rarely happened to a German ship to get caught by the corsairs 
since German shipping to Southern Europe had been much reduced owing to 
heavy competition of states which had peace treaties with the regencies29 and 
because the corsair activity had decreased sharply. 
The Hamburg Sklavenkasse ceased to exist in 1810; Lubeck’s Sklavenkasse 
was closed in 1861.30 Both offices underwent some fundamental reforms in the 
18th century which greatly changed their modes of operation. Regardless of 
these reforms, the fundamental structure always remained the same, i.e. the 
production of human security, assured by obligatory payments coming from 
crew members and shipowners. For nearly 200 years, these institutions ensured 
that almost no sailor who served on Hamburg or Lubeck ships and got caught 
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by the corsairs had to remain in North African captivity. Their success in this 
endeavor was so remarkable that in 1754 the Hamburg senate could publicly 
and triumphantly put into print that due to the work of the Sklavenkasse 
all slaves caught from our ships who had been captives in Algiers had been 
completely ransomed and were given back their freedom.31 
This is in essence what the German Sklavenkassen had always tried to be: 
the providers of nothing less than absolute human security for all of Hamburg’s 
and Lubeck’s sailors. This had been their foremost goal and it had been, at 
tremendous cost, nearly always attained.  
IV. The Governmental Institutions of Ransom 
in Denmark 
Denmark intermittently sent out some ships to southern waters during the 17th 
century. In general, it seems that Denmark could not effectively compete with 
Dutch, English or German shipping. This was in all likelihood not due to the 
several wars in which Denmark was involved, but rather to the underdeveloped 
state of its shipping industry and, probably, a lack of mercantile thinking at the 
governmental level in the first half of the 17th century.32 A noticeable increase 
can be remarked during the last decade of the 17th century, when the rest of 
Europe was at war and the two Nordic states maintained their neutrality.33 
Even though its shipping remained limited during the 17th century, Den-
mark was sometimes faced with the problem of Danish sailors in captivity in 
Northern Africa. The obvious recourse was, like in the rest of Europe, to alms 
collections.34 This sufficed as long as the shipping to Southern Europe re-
mained comparatively small. After the failure to redeem hundreds of Iceland-
ers35 it seems that better measures were demanded. In 1634 therefore, when 
Copenhagen’s Skipperlav36 was inaugurated, we find in its articles the obliga-
tion to collect money from all sailors to buy back sailors from Northern Africa. 
This Skipperlav resembled in some regards the German Sklavenkassen. There 
was the element of obligatory membership, but only for the ships’ officers: 
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Article 4: All Merchant-skippers and steersmen, which are based or live here 
in the city, shall be or are obliged to betake themselves into this Guild.37 
Even though the money for the Skipperlav came only from its members, i.e. 
the higher decks, its duties included the ransom of all sailors of a ship taken: 
Article 10: All money, which incurs into this Skippers-Guild, shall be used for 
these members, which either by Turks or religious enemies have been cap-
tured and ransomed. Crews of poor ships-brothers from this guild, as well as 
sick or injured shall also be helped.38 
We are presented with the curious situation of an organization where the in-
come base was smaller than that of the Sklavenkassen in the Hanse cities, even 
though its duties were the same and even far greater (they included many tasks 
in and around the harbor of Copenhagen). This can be explained by the rarity 
of Copenhagen ships taken by Barbary corsairs. Thus, the organization was 
theoretically equivalent to the German Sklavenkassen, but not in substance. 
Whereas the Sklavenkassen were under tremendous strain to ransom their 
sailors from the first day after their foundation, the Skipperlav was not seri-
ously tested for the greater part of the 17th century. It seems that most Danish 
ships that were caught in the 17th century came from Bergen, where a special 
fee existed since 1653 for the freeing of slaves from Africa.39 
In the years from 1670-1680, important changes took place in the patterns of 
shipping throughout Europe. French corsairs effectively reduced German and 
Dutch shipping to southern waters, much more than the Barbary corsairs had 
ever been able to. Danish shipping could not be hit hard, not having had great 
relevance south-west of Great Britain until then. Thus, the competitors were 
weakened just at the time when Danish shipping became the object of more and 
more support from the governmental side. The creation of the Kommercekolleg 
in 1668/71 in Copenhagen signaled the rapid advent of mercantilist thinking in 
Denmark, which translated into an ever-increasing commerce fleet.40 Conse-
quently, in these years we find more mentions of captured vessels from the 
Kingdom.  
In 1675, the Skipperlavs’ income base was broadened. Now, the ordinary 
sailors, though not allowed membership, also had to pay into its coffers exactly 
half the rate of the ship’s officers.41 And in 1685, this was again extended: 
After this year Danish sailors not living in Copenhagen also had to pay if their 
ship sailed from the city.42 After these changes the institution resembled the 
first German Sklavenkassen before the reforms of 1629 and 1641. One obliga-
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tory institution was responsible for the safety of all sailors on the ships of the 
city of Copenhagen. Because Europe was embroiled in huge wars after 1687 
and Denmark kept its neutrality for most of the time, the Dannebrog could 
advance further and further south in the years around 1700.43 This in turn led to 
more captives who needed ransoming. As a result, in the last decade of the 17th 
century, we see a ransoming activity of one or two Danish sailors per year.44 
At the turn of the century, this decentralized system of ransoming failed, 
when it became really demanding for the first time. In 1706 the armed frigate 
“St. Christopher” from Bergen was caught by Barbary corsairs and more than 
40 Danish sailors found themselves caught at once after having fought with 
great courage.45 Already in 1708, another Norwegian ship, the “Fortuna” from 
Drammen got caught by Algerian Corsairs. Four years later, in 1712, more than 
26 Danish sailors still remained in bondage, when two large Norwegian ships, 
the “Jomfru Anna” from Bergen and the “Ebentzer” from Arendal, were cap-
tured by the corsairs. These events again swelled the numbers of the King’s 
subjects in Northern Africa. At this point, it became obvious that the traditional 
ways of coping with this problem could no longer suffice. Collections in the 
entire kingdom did not bring in enough money and Bergen itself was over-
stretched to conduct the ransoming of its ships’ crews on its own.46 Copenha-
gen’s Skipperlav had sufficient funds, but it lacked the will to use them for the 
Norwegian ships’ crews and it lacked professionalism in conducting its task. A 
special institution, led by experts with connections to a network of merchants 
spread throughout Europe, was needed. This institution should have its only 
duty in organizing the ransom of the Danish captives from Northern Africa. 
The model which was now imitated was the one the southern neighbors of 
Denmark had by then already used successfully for decades. A Sklavenkasse 
was to be founded.47 The King personally ordered its creation, following the 
advice of Sealand’s Bishop, Christian Worm.48 It was to be led by the Bishop 
and two well-connected merchants from the capital, Abraham Klöcher and 
Johan Jørgen Soelberg.  
In one of their first letters to the magistrate of Copenhagen, the new board 
immediately liquidated the old ineffectual heritage of the skipperlav, explicitly 
stating in scathing words that they had 
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heard that the money, which the skipperlav has collected according to its 16 
articles, has swelled to a great and sufficient capital, without any captives hav-
ing been ransomed in a long time (one or another excepted).49 
The skipperlav had failed even in its core task, the ransoming of sailors from 
Copenhagen. Therefore, the new board demanded all the money from the skip-
perlav reserved for the business of ransoming, which it quickly received. 
Within a few weeks, a network of ransom was established with its financial 
hubs in Hamburg and Amsterdam and the German merchant, Johannes Pom-
mer in Venice, as its key contact person, managing the business of ransom in 
the Mediterranean itself.50 
Already before the foundation of the Slavekasse a list of 82 subjects of the 
Danish King who were languishing in Northern Africa had been compiled.51 
With the beginning of its business in April 1715, the board decided to ransom 
only the captives who had served on Danish ships when they had been caught.52 
Of these, eight could already be ransomed in just seven months, and 23 more 
were freed in the following year.53 
The Danish Slavekasse drew its income from the same sources as the Ger-
man Sklavenkassen; yet in the Kingdom the burden was much higher for the 
shipowners and much lower for the sailors. All ships which sailed to Holland, 
England, France, Spain, or Portugal had to pay three shillings per last directly 
to the Slavekasse (in Hamburg the shipowners only had to pay two thirds of 
this rate). Also, all sailors of the entire Kingdom were obliged to pay to the 
Slavekasse (in Hamburg the sailors had to pay three times as much). It is inter-
esting to remark these sailor-friendly rates in the monarchy and the shipowner-
friendly rates in the trade-cities. Additionally, biannual collections in the 
churches throughout the Kingdom also brought revenue for the Slavekasse.  
Thus, we see after 1715/16 three fully-functioning Sklavenkassen in Ham-
burg, Lubeck and Denmark, each one closely resembling its sister institutions. 
All Sklavenkassen were remarkably efficient, with almost no cases of captivity 
in Northern Africa of an insured sailor lasting longer than one year. Like its 
German counterparts, the Danish Slavekasse had always tried to be the pro-
vider of absolute security for Danish sailors on Danish ships. We can legiti-
mately conclude: It attained this goal at most times of its existence. 
The Danish Slavekasse existed until 1757. After Denmark had made its last 
peace treaty with a Maghreb state, i.e. Morocco in 1753, there was no longer a 
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Slavekassen. 30.12.1716 – Slavekassen til Kongen. 
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need to insure Danish sailors against the risk of Muslim captivity. For the 
Slavekasse, the only tasks remaining were the ransom of the last Danish cap-
tives and the unwinding of its business. During over forty years of its existence, 
the Slavekasse had not only ransomed well over two hundred Danish sailors 
from captivity54, it had also initiated and financed55 the first peace talks with 
the Barbary rulers, which in 1746 had brought Denmark the long sought-after 
peace treaty with Algiers. It had thus worked as a kind of “Ministry for Barbary 
affairs”. 
V. The Governmental Institutions of Ransom 
in the Netherlands 
After having inherited the merchants and thus the know-how and trade routes 
from Antwerp, Amsterdam became the center of the 17th century world econ-
omy.56 The common enmity of the Netherlands and Algiers against Spain 
helped the Dutch in the two decades after 1590 to liberate captured sailors from 
Algiers more easily and ensured a certain benevolence for Dutch ships.57 
With the beginning of the 12-year truce in 1609, the Netherlanders had a 
breakthrough into the Mediterranean.58 In 1611 they were able to obtain a 
treaty with the Ottoman Emperor and to install an ambassador at Constantin-
ople. It was hoped at The Hague that this would also ensure safety for Dutch 
ships from attacks from the North African corsairs. Yet the respect for orders 
from the Sultan was not too high at Algiers and the Dutch cease-fire with Spain 
irritated Algiers. Thus in the decade from 1610-1620, more and more Nether-
landers found themselves on the slave-markets of Algiers. It was decided at 
The Hague to conclude a treaty with the regency and install a consul there. The 
consul Wijnant de Keyser arrived in 1616 at Algiers and immediately began 
ransoming all Dutch slaves at the place. He used governmental funds for this 
business, expecting the States-General to pay for the liberation of the sailors. 
Yet, in this point he miscalculated. In 1618, the States-General expressly for-
bade him to continue ransoming with governmental money, officially stating 
that the state was only responsible for the sailors on warships, not for the sail-
ors on merchant ships.59 
Hereby the States-General set a precedent which would remain valid for 
more than a century to come. It took the Netherlands until 1726 to obtain a 
                                                             
54  The most eminent historian of the Danish Slavekassen has counted 224 ransomed slaves 
from 1715-1753, in: Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 161-163. 
55  Wandel 1919, 5-9; Andersen 2000, 37-54. 
56  Israel 1989, 38-42. 
57  van Krieken 2002, 16-19. 
58  Israel 1986, 164-169. 
59  van Krieken 2002, 23. 
 137
stable peace treaty with Algiers and even longer to get one with Morocco. 
Therefore, Dutch ships were constantly being captured in the 17th and at the 
beginning of the 18th century. A historian has arrived at a number of 6,000-
7,000 Netherlanders who may have at some time been captives in Northern 
Africa.60 The ransoming of the Netherlanders was normally carried out by the 
single provinces and these in turn financed it mostly through collections, lotter-
ies and money from relatives.61 On a national level, several nationwide collec-
tions were held in the aftermath of peace accords for this purpose.62 On several 
occasions, wholesale expeditions with squadrons of warships were sent out to 
do the ransoming, always with explicit orders to catch as many North Africans 
as possible in order to exchange them for their Dutch counterparts in the regen-
cies.63 
All these measures never sufficed. Algerians were hard to catch and the ex-
change rate of prisoners was disadvantageous for the Netherlanders. The great 
problem of voluntary donations was their irregularity, in stark contrast to the 
permanent collections in Denmark and the Hanse cities. Due to scarcity of 
funds, it was explicitly decided in 1663 to only ransom Netherlanders, not 
Scandinavians or Germans who had served on Dutch ships.64 Yet, even for 
Netherlanders, the money available was never enough. It has been estimated 
that the quota of Netherlanders ever ransomed was 33-50%.65 This percentage 
is much lower than the quota in Hamburg, Lubeck or Denmark, which ranged 
between 80 and 90%.66 
At times the creation of a national Sklavenkasse was seriously deliberated. 
For example, in 1717 the powerful province of Holland tried to push through 
the foundation of a Sklavenkasse, modeled after the Hamburgian, in the assem-
bly of the States-General.67 It did not succeed with this because the other prov-
inces – Zeeland is explicitly named – opposed the proposal for the following 
reasons: 
1) The corsairs would be encouraged to cruise even more if the Dutch Republic 
guaranteed all its sailors their ransom. 
2) The prices for captives would soar, thus buying back through private means 
would become more difficult. 
                                                             
60  van Krieken 2002, 131. 
61  Ridder 1986, 5-12. 
62  Ridder 1986, 12. 
63  Ridder 1986, 16-17. 
64  van Krieken 2002, 62. 
65  van Krieken 2002, 139. 
66  This figure has been established for the Danish Slavekasse and is in all likelihood also valid 
for the German Sklavenkassen: Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 161. 
67  van Krieken 2002, 93. 
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3) The North African rulers would lose interest in a peace with the Nether-
lands, because a state with a Sklavenkasse is a source of revenue for the cor-
sairs. 
4) The sailors would no longer defend themselves adequately if they were 
assured of their later ransom.68 
The last reason is especially noteworthy. In all openness it was stated that 
the terribly feared slavery in Northern Africa was helpful for the commercial 
interests of the republic’s shipping. This gruesome image put enough scare into 
the sailors to fight to the last and thus to defend the ship and the cargo better. 
The value of human security was explicitly put below security of the economy. 
The United Provinces decided not to intervene and to retain their insufficient 
system which left the ransoming to local initiatives, voluntary contributions 
and family members. 
The Dutch ransoming system seems to have been on the verge of a funda-
mental change after 1730. In 1728, after the stable peace with Algiers had been 
attained, the States-General decided to ransom all remaining 256 slaves who 
had been taken on ships from the republic, be they from the Netherlands or 
from foreign countries.69 Even after this decision, it took another seven years 
until the last one of these was liberated. From 1728 until 1736 and from 1743 
until 1749, two pastors from the Netherlands were appointed in Algiers to take 
care of the slaves from the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia.70 At this 
time a Sklavenkasse was also founded in Zierikzee, which lasted from 1732 
until 1747.71 From that year on (1747), the States-General finally accepted the 
duty of the entire state to buy back all its subjects from Northern Africa.72 
When in 1755 the long-sought peace with Morocco was finally achieved, the 
Netherlands from then on no longer needed to use governmental money to 
ransom their brethren. Had the peace treaties not been attained, the ransom 
system of the Sklavenkassen might have been introduced. 
VI. Typologies of North European Ransom 
What are we to make of these observations? We have looked at several promi-
nent Early Modern maritime states which all had to deal with the problem of 
captivity of their own subjects on a large scale and their institutional reactions 
towards the problem. Three of these states have in common that they created 
governmental offices to collect funds from their sailors and shipowners and 
                                                             
68  Nationaal Archief Den Haag, 1.01.03 – Staten Generaal, 3392, 06.07.1717. 
69  Van Krieken 2002, 103. Krieken states that this happened more to ensure the peace with 
Algiers than out of compassion for the captives. 
70  Van Krieken 2002, 137. 
71  Ridder 1986, 13-15. 
72  Ridder 1986, 14. 
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used these funds to buy back their subjects out of Northern African captivity. 
We may summarize our findings in a simplified table: 
 
Northern European Ran-
soming Systems 
Denmark, Hamburg, 
Lubeck Netherlands 
Number of captives in North-
ern Africa from 1590-1830 5-8000
73 6-700074 
Money for ransom 
Progressive taxation of the 
group concerned, additional 
alms collections 
Mostly alms collections, 
only little help from the 
state 
Organization of ransom Mostly state-run, centralized 
Mostly privately, 
decentralized 
Average duration of captivity Mostly less than one year75 Three to five years76 
Quota of redeemed captives 80-90 %77 33-50 %78 
 
Many numbers in this table are certainly highly debatable. Yet, even if we 
allow for a substantial error range, the basic and fundamental differences be-
tween the two blocs remain the same. One group created professional organiza-
tions dedicated to the ransoming of their own nation’s sailors only, and these 
institutions, everywhere called Sklavenkassen, were financed by obligatory 
duties imposed upon the endangered group. The other bloc decided expressly 
and repeatedly not to do so, even though the problem here was more or less the 
same, qualitatively and quantitatively. The lack of such organizations in the 
Netherlands had dire consequences for the Netherlanders captured in Northern 
Africa. Longer periods of slavery and a high uncertainty of an eventual ransom 
were direct consequences of the refusal of the state to intervene and to take the 
entire business into its hands. 
How are we to explain the refusal of the Netherlanders to install a Sklaven-
kasse, even though this had dramatic consequences for its sailors? Is it due to 
the very different naval power of the two blocs? Being the center of the world 
economy until and beyond 1726, when they finally concluded a lasting peace 
with the Algerians, the Netherlanders always had very different means at hand 
to take on the corsair enemy. The naval power of the Hanse cities was marginal 
in comparison with the United Provinces. The idea of naval power as a deter-
rent of Sklavenkassen gains plausibility if we look at Denmark’s Slavekasse. It 
                                                             
73  The wide range is due to the insufficient data available, especially in the cases of the Ger-
man Sklavenkassen. Yet, the figure with its two limits is the result of intense calculation 
and taking into account of all available numbers and therefore reliable. 
74  Van Krieken 2002, 131. 
75  See footnote 66. 
76  Boon 1987, 18-19. 
77  Only “national” sailors are taken into account, e.g. Hamburgians on Hamburg ships etc. 
78  Van Krieken 2002, 139. 
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was founded in 1715, when its naval power was rather weak and the institution 
ended with the ascent of Denmark’s naval power after the mid-18th century. 
The Danish case seems to confirm the thesis of incompatibility of Sklavenkas-
sen with a strong navy. 
Yet, naval power is not a very important factor in the decision process about 
Sklavenkassen. For one thing, naval expeditions against the corsairs were in 
most of the cases blatant failures. Only the British and French expeditions in 
the late 17th century had achieved their aims. But these were the exceptions to 
the general rule. The Dutch expeditions of 1618-20, 1655-56, 1662, 1664, 1670 
and 1721-24 were all costly and only partly effective at attaining their goal.79 In 
the end, The Hague had to accept a peace treaty in which permanent tributes 
were stipulated, in contrast to the tribute-free peace treaties which England and 
France were able to attain. 
But even more to the point, why should naval power stand in contradiction 
to state-organized ransoming? The historical evidence simply does not support 
such an imagined dichotomy. A state with a powerful navy like Great Britain 
had its “Algiers-duty”, very much resembling a Sklavenkasse, to finance the 
ransoming of its subjects.80 When in 1720 a “Project tot het ruineeren der 
Turkze Rovers” was put forward in the Netherlands, it was explicitly stated in 
one of its articles that a Sklavenkasse should flank the massive naval attack on 
the corsairs.81 Thus, governmentally organized ransoming and a strong navy 
within one state are not contradictions. They could and did come together, one 
could and did exist without the other or both could and often were absent. In 
the minds of the decision-makers they were to a large measure independent of 
each other. 
Are the observed differences due to the political structure of the states in 
question? The two Hanse cities were small political units, where a Sklavenkas-
se could easily be introduced by and for limited groups. The entire cities being 
very dependent on the trade towards southern waters, it was easy to convince 
all decision-makers of the advantages of Sklavenkassen for all people of the 
cities. This was not so in Denmark-Norway, where the trade routes went to a 
large degree east and northwards when the Slavekasse was introduced. Yet, in 
the absolute monarchy of Denmark-Norway, the decision-making process 
could at times be very easy. It took one memorandum from Sealand’s Bishop to 
the King to get the Slavekasse going, without any amendment.82 With a differ-
ent political structure we may well believe that Denmark-Norway would have 
gone the same way that the Netherlands did. Here, a central government with 
limited powers could only act in accord with the provinces. In an absolute 
                                                             
79  Van Krieken 2002, 26, 53-55, 57-67, 94-97. 
80  On the Algiers-duty: Matar 2005, 38-75. 
81  Project tot het ruineeren der Turkze Rovers [...] 1720. 
82  Bro-Jørgensen 1935, 159-160. 
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monarchy, this opposition could be overcome, which was not so in a republic 
with independently-minded constituent parts.  
However, it is precisely this observation that allows us to rule out the differ-
ent political structures as the causator of the (non-)introduction of Sklavenkas-
sen. The political structure was certainly important on the national level, where 
the decentralized Netherlands could not agree upon a foundation of a Sklaven-
kasse. Yet, at the local level the differences between the two blocs still remain. 
In Copenhagen after 1634, we have a de facto Sklavenkasse in the form of the 
Skipperlav with its obligatory duties and its responsibility to ransom Copenha-
gen’s sailors. It would have been very easy for the single provinces or cities in 
the Netherlands to introduce Sklavenkassen at the local level. Yet, the only 
Sklavenkasse that ever existed in the Netherlands was the local one at 
Zierikzee, a short-lived and very late foundation. Amsterdam, Middelburg and 
other great cities never had a Sklavenkasse, even though it would have been 
very easy to found one. The political structure of the large Dutch harbor cities 
was very much comparable to Hamburg and Lubeck. In all these cities the 
power lay in the hands of the richer merchants and the emerging bourgeoisie. 
The same groups of power-holders easily founded Sklavenkassen in the cities 
east of the Elbe and refused to do so west of the Elbe. Thus a political structure 
did not stand in the way of a foundation of Sklavenkassen in the Netherlands. 
VII. The Combination of Historical “Facts” 
and Sociological “Theory” 
After having refuted the more simple explanation for the found typologies, we 
are still left without a satisfying answer for the discrepancy of the ransoming 
modes. A more complex model is needed as explanandum for the differences in 
the organization of ransoming of the two blocs. This shall be done by setting 
the established typology in a broader perspective and then analyzing it anew. 
The entire phenomenon of slave ransoming has to be regarded not as something 
exceptional but structural for the affected maritime societies. The ransoming of 
Europeans was an affair so stable that we can regard it as an integral part of 
Early Modern welfare. Like the poor, the group of the slaves to be redeemed 
was an inherent part of every seafaring society in Early Modern Europe. The 
authorities were confronted with endless petitions from individuals who needed 
money to save husbands, relatives or friends from a mortal threat and, regarded 
much more dangerously, their souls from the arch-enemy of God. The endless 
flow of supplications aimed at the “imagined empathy” of an entire society. As 
we have seen, the typology of the chosen ways to produce security for the 
suffering captives exactly follows confessional lines.  
In recent years, sociology has turned considerable attention towards the 
connections between features of the modern welfare states and their respective 
dominant confession. As an offspring of the widespread discussion and re-
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search about and on the welfare state, which was sparked by the first publica-
tion of Esping-Andersen’s work on the typologies of the modern welfare states 
in 199083, the origins of the essential variations between the states of the mod-
ern West are now being traced more and more towards religious roots.84 Also, 
the historians and sociologists with an interest in the Early Modern Epoch have 
raised their voices in this debate. In his book “The disciplinary revolution”, the 
American sociologist Philip Gorski has put religion at the centre of the stage of 
Early Modern history and used it as an explanation of many different phenom-
ena of the epoch.85 Though he is mostly interested in the connections between 
the state’s power and its respective confession, he has also devoted quite con-
siderable thought to the links between the Reformation and Early Modern 
forms of poor-relief.86 Gorski in essence argues that Protestant poor-relief was 
marked by a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization at the level of 
the state. A sharp line was drawn in the Protestant world between “deserving” 
and “undeserving” poor; the former received alms, the latter were sent to the 
“Zuchthaus”. Gorski contrasts this with Catholic poor-relief, which remained to 
a large degree in the hands of the clergy and never knew a sharp distinction 
between “deserving” and “undeserving”. He also distinguishes sharply within 
Protestantism between Calvinist and Lutheran poor-relief: according to him the 
former was marked by “considerable decentralization, and a harsher but more 
activist approach towards the poor.”87 
Another sociologist, Sigrun Kahl, has elaborated on Gorski’s theses and 
made far-reaching connections between the religious doctrines of the respective 
three confessions and the social welfare systems of our present-day states.88 
Kahl finally arrives at a table of twelve stylized features of the three confes-
sions. In this table we find core theological statements on work and poverty and 
the way the poor were treated in the area of the respective confession. The 
strength of Kahl’s article lies in the very serious attempt to bridge the research 
of modern sociology on the welfare state and historical research on the Refor-
mation, both of which have more or less ignored each other in the last decades. 
Even though Kahl never uses the terms explicitly, she clearly tries to describe 
                                                             
83  Esping-Andersen 1990. 
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85  Gorski 2003. 
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87  Gorski 2003, 137. 
88  Kahl 2005. 
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distinct group attitudes of inclusion and exclusion towards its poorer members, 
the groups being distinguished by their confessions.  
Kahl tries very hard in her article to accentuate the differences between the 
Lutheran and Calvinist approach towards the poor. She empirically bases these 
differences mainly on the denseness of “Zuchthäuser” in the Calvinist and 
Lutheran areas and the degree of centralization of systems of poor-relief. From 
her article one gets the impression that the distinction between “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor was marked in Calvinist areas more by punishment of the 
“undeserving” and in Lutheran areas more by a relatively effective help for the 
“deserving”. The “deserving” got no great assistance in the Calvinist world, 
while in the Lutheran world the state actively intervened on their behalf. Kahl 
emphasizes that this state intervention in the Lutheran world happened not in 
opposition to the church but with intimate collaboration between church and 
state.89 
Since we have established that the Sklavenkassen were not an exotic but a 
normal institution of poor-relief in Early Modern Northern Europe, we can now 
look at them from the “confessional” angle. We can certainly count the sailors 
among the “deserving” poor, since they had usually fought bravely to protect 
the merchandise of their masters, the flag of their state and thus the honor of 
their rulers.90 Here was a group that clearly did not deserve the drastic plight 
into which they had fallen. Thus, the decision-making process towards finding 
an answer to the slaves’ petitions must therefore have been a very hard exercise 
for the petitioned, since they knew that they were deciding upon the fate of 
brave members of the community. Their answer to it, whether positive or nega-
tive, was thus certainly a reflection of deep convictions with regard to the 
“imagined empathy” of a given society. 
It is remarkable how well the models of Gorski and Kahl fit with the Lu-
theran Sklavenkassen. Centralized and bureaucratically operating governmental 
offices, relentlessly collecting obligatory duties and using this money in one of 
the most complicated businesses conceivable: is that not Lutheran poor-relief to 
its maximum extent? Since the buying back of sailors from slavery was just a 
form of poor-relief in extremis, we see here the Lutheran way of poor-relief at 
its extreme. This always happened, as is clearest in the case of the Danish 
Slavekasse, where Sealand’s Bishop led the entire agency, in close cooperation 
with the churches. The obligatory insurance is the qualitatively new element of 
these institutions, to which only Lutheran states resorted. For its subjects in 
danger of and actually in slavery, the Lutheran state was expected and ready to 
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90  It is important to note that only the sailors who had defended themselves bravely were 
bought back; see: § 5 of the Hamburg Sklavenkasse, printed in: Baasch 1897, 207. 
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provide absolute human security, firstly with institutions, later with the readi-
ness to sign expensive peace treaties with the Barbary regents.91 
This strong role of the Lutheran state as a redistributor of money and pro-
ducer of human security was demanded by the ruled and the authorities were 
willing to accede in this demand. An unavoidable and undeserved risk of any 
deserving member of this state was regarded as not tolerable. When such a 
danger lured, the entire system reacted and secured the neutralization of this 
threat by spreading the financial burden on the shoulders of all risk-bearers. 
This differs markedly from the Calvinist world, where the state as a nexus 
binding the people together was not as strong as in the Lutheran world. 
What can we deduce from our presentation about the Calvinist welfare 
state? Kahl has emphasized Calvin’s rejection of state involvement in matters 
of poor-relief: 
According to Calvin, poor relief should be part of the church’s ministry. 
Church and private charities retained a key role in the administration of poor 
relief. Private charity was part of proving and displaying election. In this 
sense, Calvinism kept the traditional ostentation of public giving.92 
Having no Sklavenkasse but only its repeated discussion and ultimate non-
introduction at hand, it is not hard to see a rejection of state involvement in the 
Calvinist-dominated Netherlands. Even the hard plight of its sailors in Northern 
Africa could not move the society at home to overcome its basic propositions 
on relief-giving. The result was dire for thousands of Netherlanders who got 
caught by the Muslim corsairs. 
We have to remark that the people of the United Provinces did care a lot for 
their brethren in Northern Africa. The Netherlanders gave intensely and over 
decades huge sums of alms for the ransoming of their relatives. At the moment, 
we have no data at hand but we can presume that the alms-giving in the Nether-
lands for the caught sailors brought in much more money in relation to national 
wealth than in the Lutheran world. Individual generosity tried hard to compen-
sate for the lack of a Sklavenkasse. Yet, the ratio of just 33-50% liberated sail-
ors in the richest parts of Europe proves that in the 17th century, the state as 
machinery of organization and redistribution had already far surpassed the 
ability of individual generosity and voluntary commitment. The only way to 
really produce sustainable and absolute human security lay in the intervention 
of the state, as the examples of the Lutheran neighbors showed. 
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The Netherlanders had often been asked if they wanted a Sklavenkasse to 
produce human security for all their sailors. This question could only come 
before the highest assembly of the state because the slaves in Northern Africa 
were the poor with the greatest merit. The fact that these proposals had caused 
the Netherlanders intense debates and thorough questioning of their traditional 
approach proves that the ultimate refusal of a Sklavenkasse was well-consi-
dered and has to be a reflection of the “imagined empathy” of the Netherlan-
dish society at the time. In the end, the state’s intervention was even regarded 
as harmful for the private ransomers.93 We know that this was not true and that 
individuals, for all their endeavors, could not compensate for the state in this 
regard. 
So with the case studies of the Protestant way of ransoming captives out of 
Northern Africa, we finally arrive at an observation which in itself fits very 
well into the established picture of sociological and historical literature. The 
strong role of the Lutheran state as an embodiment of mutual insurance of a 
given group and thereby as an active producer of human security can be traced 
to sources in the existing confessional mentality. The Calvinist state did not act 
the same way that the Lutheran did; it openly decided not to produce human 
security when this came into conflict with trade security. The Calvinist state 
left this most essential sort of poor-relief to the society at large and thus pre-
ferred the production of security for the economy of its system, not for indi-
viduals. The Lutheran state appears as a social system marked by a high degree 
of inclusiveness for all deserving members of the community, while the Calvin-
ist state appears as a social system marked by more exclusive tendencies, even 
for its deserving members. 
References 
Printed Sources 
Project tot het ruineeren der Turkze Rovers van Algier, Tunis, Tripoly en Zalee: 
Niet alleen tot het beveyligen maar het doen aangroejen van de Navigatie en 
Commercie deeser Landen (1720), in: Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, Hist. Turc. 
64/3 
Human Development Report 1994 – New Dimensions of Human Security. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994> (accessed July 29, 2010). 
References 
Andersen, Dan. The Danish Flag in the Mediterranean. Shipping and Trade, 1747-
1807. Unpublished PhD, University of Copenhagen, 2000. 
                                                             
93  See footnote 68. 
 146
Baasch, Ernst. Die Hansestädte und die Barbaresken. Kassel: Brunnemann, 1897. 
Beutin, Ludwig. Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebiet bis zu den Napoleo-
nischen Kriegen. Wachholtz, 1933. 
Bono, Salvatore. Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e musulmani fra guerra 
schiavitù e commercio. Milan: Mondadori, 1993. 
Bro-Jørgensen, J.O. Forsikringsvæsenets Historie i Danmark indtil det 19. 
Aarhundrede. Copenhagen: Wesmanns Skandinaviske Forsikringsfond, 1935. 
Bruijn, Jacobus. “De vaart in Europa.” In Maritieme geschiedenis der Nederlanden 
2. Zeventiende eeuw, van 1585 tot ca. 1680, edited by Gustaaf Asaert, 200-241. 
De Boer maritiem. Bussum: De Boer, 1977. 
Dams, Jean. “Une ‘redemption’ de captifs au XVIIe siècle.” Mélanges de Science 
Religieuse 42 (1985): 141-148. 
Davis, Robert. “Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast.” Past and Present 
172, no. 1 (2001): 87-124. 
Davis, Robert. “Slave redemption in Venice, 1585-1797.” In Venice reconsidered: 
The history and civilization of an Italian city-state, 1297-1797, edited by John 
Martin and Dennis Romano, 454-490. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002. 
Davis, Robert. Christian slaves, Muslim masters: White slavery in the Mediterra-
nean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2003. 
Degn, Ole, and Erik Gøbel. Skuder og kompagnier. Dansk søfarts Historie 2, 1588-
1720. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997. 
Boon, Piet. Een Westfriese zeeman als slaaf in Barbarije: Verslag van de 
belevenissen van Jan Cornelisz Dekker in Marokko, 1715-1743. Schoorl: Pirola, 
1987. 
Ekegård, Einar. Studier i svensk handelspolitik under den tidigare frihetstiden. 
Uppsala: Appelberg, 1924. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1990. 
Fossen, Anders. “«Under det Tyrkiske Aag og Tyranni». Bergens sjøfart og 
Barbareskstatene ca. 1630-1845.” Sjøfarts-historisk Årbok (1979): 233-256. 
Friedman, Ellen. Spanish captives in North Africa in the early modern age. Madi-
son, University of Wisconson Press, 1983. 
Gorski, Philip. The disciplinary revolution: Calvinism and the rise of the state in 
early modern Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
Hassø, Arthur G. Københavns Skipperlav 1634-1934. Copenhagen: Københavns 
Skipperforening, 1934. 
Heers, Jacques. Les Barbaresques: La course et la guerre en Méditerranée XIVe-
XVIe siècle. Paris: Perrin, 2001. 
Helgason, þorsteinn. “Historical narrative as collective therapy: The case of the 
Turkish raid in Iceland.” Scandinavian Journal of History 22 (1997): 275-289. 
Hunt, Lynn A. Inventing human rights: A history. New York: Norton, 2007.  
Israel, Jonathan. “The phasis of Dutch straatvaart 1590-1713.” Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 49 (1986): 133-162. 
Israel, Jonathan. Dutch primacy in world trade, 1585-1740. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989. 
 147
Kahl, Sigrun. “The Religious Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic, Lutheran, 
and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared.” Archives européennes de Socio-
logie 46, no. 1 (2005): 91-126. 
Kresse, Walter. Von armen Seefahrern und den Schifferalten zu Hamburg. Ham-
burg: Christians, 1981. 
Larquie, Claude. “La Méditerranée, L'Espagne et le Maghreb au XVIIe siècle. Le 
rachat des chrétiens et le commerce des hommes.” Les Cahiers de Tunisie 43 
(1991): 75-90. 
Lucchini, Enrica. La merce umana: Schiavitù e riscatto dei liguri nel Seicento. 
Roma: Bonacci, 1990. 
MacFarlane, Neil and Yuen Foong Khong. Human security and the UN: a critical 
history. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 
Manow, Philip. “‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’-Esping-Andersen’s Regime 
Typology and the Religious Roots of the Western Welfare State.” MPIfG Work-
ing Papers 04/3 (2004) <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp04-3/wp04-3.html> 
(accessed June 22, 2010). 
Matar, Nabil. Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689. Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2005.  
Møller, Anders M. “Oprettelsen af Slavekommissionen.” Handels- og 
Søfartsmussets Årbog 57 (1998): 100-115. 
Nielsen, Axel. Dänische Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Jena: G. Fischer, 1933. 
Panzac, Daniel. La marine ottomane: De l‘apogée à la chute de l‘Empire; (1572-
1923). Paris: CNRS, 2009. 
Ridder, C. J. den. “Gedenk de gevangenen alsof gij medegevangenen waart. De 
loskoop van Hollandse zeelieden uit Barbarijse gevangenschap, 1600-1746.” 
Tijdschrift voor zeegeschiedenis 5 (1986): 3-22. 
Rühle, Siegfried. “Danzigs Handelsbeziehungen zu Portugal und Spanien.” In 
Danzigs Handel in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, edited by Siegfried Rühle, 
107-23. Danzig: Kafemann, 1925. 
van Krieken, Gerard. Corsaires et marchands: Les relations entre Alger et les Pays-
Bas, 1604-1830. Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2002.  
Wandel, Carl F. Danmark og Barbareskerne: 1746-1845. Copenhagen: Lund, 1919. 
Wehrmann, Carl. “Geschichte der Sklavenkasse.” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübe-
ckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 4 (1884): 158-193. 
